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ABSTRACT 
 
PATRICK MILLER: Whats the Matter with The Republican Party?: 
Factionalism in Party Primaries, 1976-2000 
(Under the direction of George B. Rabinowitz) 
 
Thomas Franks Whats the Matter with Kansas argues that social issues have 
become more important to lower income voters than economic issues, leading to a greater 
probability for them to vote against their own economic interests by voting for 
conservative candidates.  This paper takes his much disputed theory and applies it to the 
Republican primary elections rather than general elections.  Scholars have documented 
the presence of a conservative Republican wing associated with the religious right and a 
more moderate wing which emphasizes social issues less and distances itself from the 
religious right.  My analysis connects this elite level dynamic to mass political behavior 
through an examination of county level election returns in presidential primaries from 
1976 through 2000.  When candidates from the two wings engage in a competitive 
national primary a pattern emerges that shows different demographic sources of support 
for the two factions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In Whats the Matter with Kansas, a qualitative analysis of Kansas Republican Party 
politics, Thomas Frank argues that working class voters have come to care more about social 
issues than economic issues.  As a result, these lower income voters are not only more likely 
to vote Republican than in the past, but also more inclined to support the far religious right of 
the Republican Party.  In essence poorer voters are voting against their economic interests by 
supporting fiscally conservative candidates who court them through appeals to faith and hard 
right positions on classic culture war issues such as abortion, gay rights, and teaching 
creationism in public schools. 
 Franks thesis certainly has its detractors.  Stonecash (2000) and Bartels (2005, 2006), 
the latter responding directly to the assertions in WMK, both present strong evidence for the 
idea that lower income voters still support Democrats and still weigh economic issues more 
heavily than social issues.  Frank has fired back with his own rebuttal1 in an attempt to 
salvage his theory.  Both sides present credible evidence for and against the picture of faith 
based, working class conservatism painted in WMK. 
 Though many scholars dismiss WMK as unscientific entertainment, I believe Frank 
touches on an important phenomenon deeper than the debate over the voting tendencies of 
the working class in the general election.  At its core, the book is a case study of a Kansas 
Republican Party which has thoroughly divided itself into two competing factions that are 
                                                
1 http://www.tcfrank.com/dismissd.pdf 
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often more at war with each other than they are with the minority Democrats in the state.  
These factions do not define themselves along economic cleavages, though sometimes issues 
such as no new tax pledges do arise in primaries pitting candidates from the two factions 
against each other.  Instead, they divide along religious, so called culture war lines, with a 
coalition of moderate, libertarian, and economic conservatives/social moderates facing a rival 
camp of socially and economically conservative Republicans affiliated with the religious 
right and drawing upon the grassroots support of Evangelical Protestants.   
This form of factionalism within state Republican parties is nothing new.  Indeed, 
since the late 1970s as the religious right has grown in both its organizational strength and 
its importance as part of the Republican base, many states have seen Republican party 
politics evolve into perpetual bitter feuds between the moderate2 and conservative 
camps.  Kansas Republican primaries have been bloody battlefields between moderates and 
conservatives since the early 1990s, often featuring races more expensive and more caustic 
than the general election (Cigler and Loomis 2000).  Kansas Democrats were able to 
capitalize on this division in 2006 as they recruited many prominent moderate Republicans to 
run under the Democratic label, resulting in the defeat of every Republican conservative 
running statewide3 and rare Democratic gains in the state legislature.   
                                                
2 I use the terms moderate and conservative loosely.  At least within the ideological range of the Republican 
Party, the moderates are certainly more moderate than the conservatives, though they are certainly farther to the 
right than the Democrats.  Since these are the terms used in both WMK and accounts of state Republican politics 
in the Kansas press, I shall stay in that tradition. 
 
3 Interesting note: The 2006 elections show the dramatic consequences of this party division in Kansas, one of 
the most Republican states in the country.  Moderate Republican incumbents holding statewide constitutional 
offices (secretary of state, treasurer, insurance commissioner) survived brutal primaries in 2006, but the 
Democrats did not seriously target them for defeat.  Democrats instead focused on reelecting Governor 
Kathleen Sebelius whose current and past lieutenant governors have been party-switching past chairs of the 
Kansas Republican Party.  They also convinced the GOP county prosecutor in Johnson County, Kansass 
largest jurisdiction, to switch parties, resulting in the defeat of the ultra-conservative incumbent Republican 
attorney general.  Party switching Democrat Nancy Boyda also knocked off a far right six term GOP 
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Such party in-fighting is not a single state phenomenon.  Most recently in the 2005 
Virginia elections the extreme conservatism of the Republican gubernatorial nominee drove a 
more moderate Republican state senator into the race as an independent (Shear 2005b).  
Earlier that year in the Virginia legislative primaries, over a dozen fundamentalist candidates, 
many recruited by religious right organizations and many of whom received the tacit support 
of the official Republican Party organization, challenged incumbent legislators perceived as 
too moderate on social issues and taxes (Shear 2005a).  Actively challenging and defeating 
your own safe incumbents is perhaps the most irrational thing a party organization can do; 
however, this is exactly what is happening in states all over the country, resulting in the loss 
of many of these open seats to the Democrats.  Other scholars have documented the rise of 
the religious right as a major faction at the national level (Oldfield 1996, Layman 2001). 
 Clearly the Republican Party is home to two competing groups  the organized 
religious right with a universally conservative message on economic and social issues and a 
second, more moderate group that, if its members have nothing else in common, is loosely 
held together by its opposition to extreme religious conservatism.  Though this religious 
divide manifests itself more prominently in some states than others, it is certainly fair to say 
it exists, at the very least at the level of political elites.  Given that, where do these two 
factions find their support?  What demographics support them?  Is this elite factionalism 
reflected in the behavior of the Republican masses  the party-in-the-electorate?  We as 
political scientists have established fairly well that these two factions exist at least in the elite 
circles of Republican Party politics.  It is critical we begin extending our analyses to the 
                                                                                                                                                  
congressman in one of the nations most Republican congressional districts by capitalizing on the moderate-
conservative division within Republican ranks. 
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partisan masses to understand better the relationship between elite dynamics and mass 
electoral behavior.   
 
THEORY 
 
Frank argues that if we dissect the electoral map, certain demographics are more 
likely to support one faction of Republicans over the other.  Geographical areas characterized 
by lower real estate values, lower per capita incomes, and fewer people with college 
educations are more likely to support conservatives in his view (Frank 2004, 104).  To 
Franks profile I would add that areas with greater numbers of Evangelical Protestants should 
be more likely to support the conservative wing.  It is widely documented that Evangelical 
Protestants are the religious group most likely to support the religious right agenda (i.e. Guth 
et al 1996).  This combination of characteristics has strong theoretical grounding in the large 
number of studies which characterize Evangelicals as poorer than the average American and 
less educated (i.e. Karnes et al. 2005).  Areas not fitting this profile should be more likely to 
support more moderate Republican candidates.   
As the competition between the factions takes place in the context of party primaries, 
those elections are the focus of my analysis.  Primaries are quite useful tools for party 
factions because they provide information to potential voters belonging to these competing 
intra-party groups about which candidate is most sympathetic to a particular identity group, 
issue group, or ideology (Bartels1988); in essence, they are learning opportunities which 
allow the partisan masses to behave as if they are reflecting the divisions of their respective 
party elites. 
 5 
 
Is this picture of factionalism a valid representation of the Republican party-in-the-
electorate?  At the mass level, is there one camp of poorer, less educated, more Evangelical 
Republicans towing the more conservative line on a litany of economic and social issues?  Is 
there a rival group of higher income, better educated, and less Evangelical Republicans 
supporting a more moderate, perhaps economically conservative but socially more liberal, 
agenda?  I argue that such a division does indeed exist at the mass level, but that electoral 
conditions must be right for it to emerge. 
Certainly not every Republican primary evolves into a fight between the moderate 
and the conservative.  Many Republicans of both ideological camps are obviously unopposed 
in primaries ranging from the presidency to local school boards in every election cycle.  
Though the questions of candidate emergence and under what circumstances candidates from 
the two factions contest the primary are important, I do not address them in this work.  
However, when a credible candidate from the conservative wing competes against a credible 
candidate from the moderate wing, we should see these voting divisions emerge within the 
mass primary electorate.   
Candidate credibility is important because more serious, higher quality candidates are 
more likely to be able to raise the money needed to communicate their messages to primary 
voters than candidates of less quality.  Only if voters receive and internalize messages from 
two competing candidates will they be able to learn enough information to place those 
candidates in one party faction or the other.  This enables primary voters to engage in sincere 
voting that best reflects their interests and their own identification with partisan factions.  
Serious candidates, as opposed to less serious, gadfly candidates, are better able to 
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convince calculating voters that casting a ballot for them is not a wasted vote; instead, that 
ballot is a strategically well used vote for a potential winner.   
How do social issues come to the front of the primary contest, though?  In the context 
of most recent Republican primaries, all of the major candidates have run as fiscal 
conservatives.  Even the moderates in these races generally run on platforms of cutting taxes, 
refusing to sign new tax increases into law, rolling back federal spending to cut the deficit, or 
balancing the budget.  Social issues and image are where the real differences appear between 
candidates, providing the kind of contrast and candidate definition that allows voters to form 
impressions of the ideological orientations of the candidates and to associate them with 
various constituencies in the party.  If McCain and Bush take generally conservative 
positions on economic issues in 2000 (though with some policy differences between them), 
then the key contrast between them becomes their vehement disagreement over the role of 
the religious right in the party (Caesar and Busch 2001).  Likewise, abortion provides a key 
contrast between Bush and Reagan in 1980 (Rae 1989).  When these social issues take on a 
prominent role in a primary between two genuinely credible candidates, we can expect to see 
WMK-style division in the Republican ranks.   
 
WHY NOT INDIVIDUAL DATA? 
 
I analyze county level election returns from Republican presidential primaries from 
1976 through 2000 to see whether or not this division emerges in the aggregate.  Why 
aggregate and not individual level data?  If the religious right is the core of the conservative 
wing and its power base has been growing in Republican circles over the course of several 
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decades, the most feasible approach is to look at primary returns over the long term.  Exit 
polls do ask respondents to identify whether or not they are members of the religious right, 
but the wording of the question changes over time and it is not present in all state polls 
during the twenty-four year period in question. Even in 2000 when the Christian right 
actually became an issue itself, the item was not in all state exit polls and it varied between 
asking respondents whether they are born again or whether they belong to the religious 
right.  Whether this religious right question measures religious belief, movement affiliation, 
or some other concept is another question all together.   
Explicit measures of religious belief are absent from the exit polls, though the closest 
they get to it is the lone question occasionally appearing asking respondents whether or not 
they are born again Christians.  This item does not appear frequently nor is it in enough state 
exit polls even in one year to be a useful measurement tool for this analysis.  Church 
attendance might be useful as a way to operationalize religion and certainly more frequent 
church attendees who go to fundamentalist churches are more likely to hear conservative 
political messages (Guth et al. 1998), but that measure does not capture the strong association 
of the religious right with Evangelicalism. 
Denomination or religious belonging, then, is the only remaining conceptualization of 
religion useful for this analysis.  Unfortunately, while exit polls report the number of 
Catholics voting in the primary, the data do not distinguish between Mainline versus 
Evangelical Protestants.  This is a critical distinction given the differing politics of the two 
groups, with Mainline Protestants on average being more liberal than Evangelicals on social 
issues and more resistant to the political appeals of the religious right (Fowler et al. 2004).  
While Evangelicalism is not synonymous with fundamentalism or the broader religious right 
 8 
 
movement and even though the movement has appeal to some Catholics and Mainline 
Protestants, Evangelicals are the core of the constituency the movement seeks to mobilize 
(Guth et al. 1996). 
Since individual level data are inadequate and since Frank frames his theory of who 
socially conservative Republicans are in terms of what the areas look like where you can find 
them, the county level is the next best focus where we can find consistent demographic and 
election data.  Fortunately, using data from the Churches and Church Membership reports 
from 1970 through 1990 and the Religious Congregations and Membership in the United 
States 20004 report, we can construct a fairly valid approximation of the religious make up of 
a county in terms of Catholics, Mainline, and Evangelical Protestants.  Thus, aggregate data 
are more practical than individual data. 
 
MODEL 
 
The thesis here is fundamentally about division between candidates in primaries.   
The best approach for measuring this division is to set up a regression equation for each 
primary in question modeling the percentage of the overall vote a certain candidate receives.  
For example, in 1976 we would construct one equation modeling the Reagan share of the 
Reagan plus Ford vote total.  Though one may be tempted to set up a separate regression 
equation for each candidate competing in a primary modeling the percentage of the vote he 
receives, a more appropriate test that reflects the concept of division would be the single 
equation for each contest.  If we create separate equations for Ford and Reagan in 1976, for 
                                                
4 Data are available at the Association of Religion Data Archives (www.thearda.com).  I would extend this 
analysis further back than 1976 to a period before the religious right movement become such a strong force, but 
there are no county religious data available for 1960.  Data for 1950 are, however, available. 
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example, we may get results that tell us that a predictor like income is significant for one 
candidate but not the other.  This does not make sense theoretically.  Each independent 
variable either significantly affects the choice between Ford and Reagan or it does not.  If a 
variable affects the decision to vote for Ford, then it automatically affects the Reagan vote 
share.  The electoral choice is an evaluation of the competing candidates and their images 
and positions against each other, not separately.   
See appendix 1 for a full description of the variables in the model and more in-depth 
rationale for why I use certain predictors.  For years in which there are only two major 
primary candidates, I drop out minor candidates, candidates not competing in all primary 
states, no preference votes, none of the above votes, and write-ins.  For years in which 
there are more than two major candidates, I model the division between the candidate most 
affiliated with the religious right and the candidate who ultimately wins the nomination.  This 
means that I model the Robertson share of the Robertson plus Bush vote in 1988 and the 
Buchanan share of the Buchanan plus Dole vote in 1996.  Though other candidates do contest 
these primaries, Bush and Dole are clear frontrunners who dominate the contests while rival 
candidates perform much more poorly.  Frontrunners are the most credible candidates, so it is 
important that include them in my analysis.   
Robertson and Buchanan are the candidates in 1988 and 1996 respectively who most 
seriously court the religious right.  Though they eventually lost, both men start their 
respective primary seasons with unexpectedly strong showings.  Robertson earned a 
surprising second place finish in the Iowa caucus, while Buchanan upset Dole in the New 
Hampshire primary.  Each of these contests gave the candidates momentum to carry on with 
their ultimately unsuccessful bids.  As such, Robertson and Buchanan certainly do not merit 
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being labeled as less credible candidates or gadflies, terms we might call contenders such as 
Alan Keyes or Gary Bauer in 2000 who never demonstrate the ability to contest even a single 
primary seriously.   
For all election years in question, I stop including primaries in the data sets after the 
point in the season at which the race no longer remains competitive (see election year 
descriptions for further details).  This eliminates returns where one candidate receives a 
massively inflated percentage of the vote because his opponents are no longer actively 
campaigning even though their names remain on the ballot.  Other scholars have argued that 
there is a critical time component in the primary vote in that momentum is accumulated 
early, and then it either builds or decays from one contest to another rather than being stable 
throughout the period of several weeks (Norrander 1993).  I do not necessarily argue with 
this theory, but the best measure the literature uses to account for this in primary vote models 
is including candidate vote share in the most recent primary as an independent variable in a 
regression.   
 
[Table 1 Here] 
 
Table 1 shows the primaries I include in my analysis and the vote shares of the 
candidates I study.  If we look at a losing candidate like George Bush in 1980, his 
performance does not seem particularly related to his previous wins and losses.  He loses 
New Hampshire rather decisively, but actually scores his biggest win in Michigan at the tail 
end of the competitive period (the day before he concedes to Ronald Reagan).  He gets 19% 
in Louisiana one day, wins Pennsylvania and Texas with 51% right after, then drops back 
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down to 16% just three days after his Texas win.  These results do not appear driven by 
decaying momentum from primary losses, so I find Norranders (1993) method of using 
lagged vote share as a predictor particularly unsatisfying. .   
Pooling contests in the competitive period is a better approach, thereby controlling for 
competition and momentum through the design of the study.  Both of these factors 
necessarily stop being relevant when a candidate loses the nomination war, not individual 
battles.  Looking at any of the losing candidates in Table 1, their vote shares in races where 
their names are still on the ballot drop off massively after the final primaries shown.  It would 
appear, then, that primary voters are certainly attentive enough to realize when a candidate 
has either dropped out or clearly lost, but they are not basing their votes for the most part on 
how that candidate performed in the state where their fellow partisans most recently went to 
the polls.  
The regression model I use is: 
 
Candidate Vote % = 
β0 +  
β1 (per capita county income) +  
β2 (% of county population with a bachelors degree or higher) +  
β3 (% of county population attending Mainline Protestant churches) +  
β4 (% of county population attending Catholic churches) +  
β5 (% of county population attending Evangelical churches) +  
β6 (% of county population that is racial minority) +  
β7 (Republican presidential vote %) +  
β8-∞ (dummies for individual states) +  
εi 
 
ELECTIONS 
 
I include six relevant elections in my analysis: 
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●1976  Ronald Reagan is more conservative than Gerald Ford on racial, social, and 
economic issues (Rae 1989).  The entire primary season is competitive, so all primaries are 
included in the data set.  Reagan goes into the convention hoping Ford delegates will 
abandon the incumbent in favor of his more conservative challenge.  The model should 
predict county vote decently in this year as Reagan is a very credible challenger. 
 
●1980  George Bush is the choice of the more moderate Republican establishment (Rae 
1989).  Reagan reaches out more extensively to religious conservatives than he did in 1976, 
courting groups such as the Moral Majority and shifting his emphasis from the implicitly 
racial issues he used against Ford to more social issues like abortion.  Bush wins his last 
primary in Michigan on March 20, two months after New Hampshire.  Despite this win, 
Reagans mounting victories give him enough delegates to clinch the nomination and Bush 
drops out the next day.  Again, Bush and Reagan are both credible candidates, so I expect the 
model of party factionalism will perform well. 
 
●1988  Bush is the front runner from the start and secures the nomination on March 15 with 
his win in Illinois one month after New Hampshire (Barone and Ujifasa 1990).  Bush 
campaigns on socially conservative positions, but is not perceived as a religious conservative 
nor does he market himself as such.  Televangelist Pat Robertson runs in the primaries, 
however, and consistently garners between 10% and 25% of the primary vote through Bushs 
win in Illinois (Wilcox 1992).  Despite some early caucus victories, Robertson fares much 
more poorly in primaries, a venue where his highly committed supporters are less likely to 
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dominate.  Given Bushs front runner status and the lack of a strong showing from 
Robertson, I do not believe the model will work well in this year. 
 
●1992  Though George Bushs renomination is never seriously in doubt, he faces a 
vigorous challenge on his economic and social right from commentator Pat Buchanan 
(Barone and Ujifasa 1994).  Buchanan makes explicit appeals to the religious right for 
support, but gains little traction.  He admits after his loss in Connecticut on March 24, that he 
cannot win the nomination; however, he continues to campaign even though this admission 
leads to greatly diminished vote shares.  Buchanans quixotic bid is not credible enough to 
allow the two party factions to polarize fully around the candidates, so the model should not 
perform well. 
 
●1996  Buchanan again mounts an underdog, hard right challenge to frontrunner Bob Dole.  
His performance is better than in 1992, but Dole wins the nomination outright after the 
March 26 primaries (Barone, Cohen, and Ujifasa 1998).  Buchanans campaign yet again is 
not strong enough to overcome the frontrunner, so the model should not perform well this 
year. 
   
●2000  Fundamentalists Alan Keyes and Gary Bauer run in the primary, though their 
campaigns are never credible.  George W. Bush is the candidate who allies himself most with 
the religious right and he courts the movement aggressively during the nomination phase 
even to the point of openly identifying himself as a born again Christian, a move no major 
presidential contender had done since Democrat Jimmy Carter in 1976 (Caeser and Busch 
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2001).  John McCain rails against the influence of social conservatives and the religious right 
movement over the Republican Party, calling Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson evil 
influence[s] and agent[s] of intolerance.  Bushs delegate lead becomes overwhelming 
after the Super Tuesday (March 7), causing McCain to suspend his campaign the next day.  
Given the polarization over the role of religious conservatives in the party this year, the 
model should work very well at predicting the county vote.  
 
ELECTION RESULTS 
 
 Table 2 shows regression results of county level election returns for conservative 
Republican presidential primary candidates from 1976 to 2000.5  The thesis I derive from 
Franks WMK story is that there is factionalism within the Republican Party, and that it falls 
along lines of income, education, and religion.6  If any one of these factors is significant, we 
                                                
5 Notes on diagnostics and method: Estimates are derived using robust regression to remedy issues of 
heteroskedasticity.  The 1976 model passes the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test with an insignificant chi-squared 
value; however, all other years fails the test with significant chi-squared values, indicating heteroskedasticity. 
OLS assumes homoskedasticity, so I cannot use it without violating a basic OLS assumption.  Robust standard 
errors compensate for heteroskedasticity, so I use it on all six election models, including 1976, for consistency.  
Though I do not present all six correlation matrices, the per capita income and college education correlation is 
by far the strongest correlation in the data sets in that it is the only correlation ever to exceed a .5 value.  It is 
also the only one whose value led me to worry about multicollinearity.  I ran the variance inflation factor test 
after each regression.  Each application of the model passed the test with VIF values substantially less than 10, 
the point at which multicollinearity becomes a methodological problem.  Lastly, I tested for influential data 
points which might excessively affect the regression results due to their status as outliers or their having 
leverage.  I calculated difference in fitted value (DFFITS) measures after the regression.  After correcting for a 
handful of miscoded data points, no cases exhibited DFFITS scores in excess of -1 or 1, so I am not concerned 
about leverage. 
 
6 To control for possible fixed effects I include dummy variables in the regression for individual states.  See 
Appendix 3 for a chart of the coefficients for all states in the six models.  The baseline for the dummies is New 
England.  The states in New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont) have so few counties in each that I was uncomfortable making any single one of the baseline, so I 
combined them into one dummy.  I do not see this as a problematic approach because the states in the region are 
all very similar in both their demographic homogeneity and their primary election results.  Including fixed 
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are better able to understand the sort of divisiveness Frank paints in his book and which is 
very typical of many state Republican parties. 
 
[Table 2 Here] 
 
 How do the predictors of the greatest theoretical interest perform in the model?  
County per capita income turns out to be a virtually irrelevant predictor of the primary vote.  
Of the six primaries analyzed, it is significant for only the 1976 and 1980 contests.  Ignoring 
the significance levels for a moment, the result for per capita income is contrary to my theory 
in that more conservative candidates are performing better in wealthier counties with the 
exception of Reagan in 1980.  Interestingly, the two Reagan results, the only effects which 
are significant, mirror each other.  For a $1,000 increase in per capita income in 1976, 
Reagan does about half a percent better in a county, but the finding is the opposite four years 
later and stronger.   
Income is surprisingly not included in all of the state exit polls for the Republican 
primaries; in fact, in no single year is it even an item in all of the state polls as it is absent 
from some of the primaries.  The measure they do have is personal income rather than per 
capita income and the dollar values defining income categories respondents choose from 
actually change from exit poll to exit poll, even within the same year; however, simply 
looking at the data show that more moderate candidates do tend to do better with 
Republicans who earn more money.  The measurement variations with the exit polls prevent 
us from performing a reliable statistical analysis with pooled data.   
                                                                                                                                                  
effects dummies does not change the overall interpretation of the results.  I also combing Delaware and 
Maryland because the former only has three counties. 
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We cannot be sure whether or not these aggregate income results actually indicate 
that wealthier Republicans are voting for the more conservative candidate, but this result 
does not bode well for the WMK thesis given its prediction that cultural conservatives would 
run better in poorer locations.  Controlling for education, though, helps explain the 
irrelevancy of income.  For all post-Reagan elections income has no significant effect on the 
vote in the full model.  Regressing income alone on vote share paints a different picture, 
however.  For example, in the 2000 primary income yields a coefficient of -.938 (significant 
at p<.001 for a $1000 increase), a substantively strong effect in the predicted direction 
indicating that wealthier counties have a tendency to vote against Bush.  Thus, once 
education is introduced into the regression, the income effect vanishes and, if anything, 
conservatives do better in the richer counties, but this effect is insignificant.  The effect of 
income, then, is generally an indirect one that is mediated by education rather than exerting 
direct effects on voting patterns itself. 
College education at the county level is the predictor that exerts the largest 
substantive effect on the vote.  The coefficients on this variable are both ample in size and in 
the predicted direction, offering support for the WMK thesis as applied to Republican 
primaries.  Its effect consistently works against the more conservative primary candidates as 
indicated by the negative coefficients and the result is actually significant in all contests 
except for Buchanan in 1992.  Reagan suffers the most in better educated counties, losing 
roughly 1% for every percentage increase in college educated residents.  The education 
effects, however, are still substantial in other years, mainly 1996 and 2000.  Whereas I 
posited that we would see division in the Republican electoral ranks only when two very 
credible candidates faced each other, the fact that the Buchanan 1996 effect is larger than the 
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Bush 2000 effect seemingly indicates that county education is a decent predictor of vote 
share even when less serious candidates contest the nomination.   
We must bear in mind that we cannot make confident generalizations about individual 
behavior from aggregate data; however, regardless of the ecological inference problem, 
aggregate results are always driven by some individual behavior.  We should devote some 
mental energy to theorizing about what might be happening at the individual level.  If better 
educated Republicans are more moderate, a reasonable inference given the positive 
relationship between education and social liberalism (Himmelstein and McRae 1988), and 
they reject the Christian conservative agenda, perhaps the education effects reflect their 
reactions against social conservatives.   
There is some support for this proposition in individual level data.  If we look at the 
exit polls, better educated respondents are significantly more likely to vote for the more 
moderate Republican candidates as a simple direct effect.  We should accept this result 
cautiously, however, given that we cannot reproduce the aggregate model fully for even one 
election year because of the problems previously described with the religion measures.  
Surprisingly, even predictors as basic to political behavior as income and ideology that are 
always on general election exit polls are not included on all of the primary exit polls as they 
are missing for many states in different years.  Furthermore, given the significance of racial 
proximity as a predictor for several years as seen in the minority percentage variable in Table 
2 (Glaser 1997; Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000) and the lack of racial attitude measures in the 
exit polls, any attempt to replicate this model with individual data is essentially futile.  
Income and racial attitudes are both closely related to education, so even the finding that 
education has a direct effect that advantages more moderate Republicans should be looked 
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upon cautiously given that we cannot account for these other two important effects.  
Nevertheless, aggregate data always reflect some underlying micro behavior summed up 
across individuals, so it is worth thinking about what dynamics are actually driving the 
effects of education at the county level even if we cannot test our ideas fully. 
To Franks theory I add measures of religious belonging.  How do these predictors 
perform?  There is literature which empirically supports the idea that county level measures 
of religious affiliation are indeed indicative of how various denominational groups are voting 
(Campbell 2006), but one article on this matter does not constitute a broad enough literature 
in my view to toss aside ecological fallacy considerations and make the kind of 
generalizations to individual level behavior that we might with a well studied aggregate 
measure like minority population.  Thus, we should keep in mind this qualification as we 
examine the religion effect.   
The main variable of concern is county level Evangelicalism as it is Evangelical 
Protestants who form the core of the religious right movement.  This variable generally 
performs as predicted in that it benefits conservative primary candidates with the curious 
exception of 1976; in fact, it is the only religion variable here which consistently shows 
significant effects.  Evangelicalism is not nearly as substantively important as the education 
effect, however.  As the values on this variable run from zero to nearly 100% in the actual 
data, the real gains a candidate can nab at the county level from Evangelicalism hover in the 
10% range.   
There also does not appear to be any discrimination between candidates based upon 
their credibility.  While Reagan 1980 and Bush 2000 certainly do make substantial gains in 
more Evangelical localities, the Republican who benefits the most is arguably the least 
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credible and most extreme contender in the lot  Pat Robertson.  We might theorize that this 
1988 effect is a result of his candidacy mobilizing the Evangelical vote, a conclusion the 
Campbell piece relating aggregate and individual data would certainly support and the scant 
literature on Robertson certainly shows strong mobilization among fundamentalists resulting 
from his campaign (Wilcox 1992); however, we do not have enough concrete evidence here 
to support such a supposition about what individual level effects these aggregate data might 
be indicating.  At best we are left with the supportive finding that more socially conservative 
candidates do fare better in counties with greater numbers of Evangelical adherents. 
The contrast between the significant Reagan gains from Evangelicalism in 1980 and 
the significant and slightly greater losses he suffers in 1976 is worth exploring a bit given the 
importance of this predictor.  Reagan actually does receive a sizeable boost from county 
Evangelicalism in 1976 (.122, p<.001) until I add both college education and minority 
population to the regression, though neither of these controls alone is enough to make 
religion switch signs.  Thus, the direct effect of Evangelicalism is as expected, but it takes 
both education and minority percentage to flip it.  Given the significance of both education 
and race in 2000, as well, and the significant but positive boost for Bush from 
Evangelicalism, there is clearly some dynamic that distinguishes these two elections.  Reagan 
performs worse in counties with more religious adherents if we look at all three religion 
variables, though this effect is not significant for Mainline Protestants and Catholics.  If we 
run the model on individual states rather than the entire set of states in the 1976 data set, this 
effect generally replicates itself.7  This is a curious exception to the Evangelicalism effect 
                                                
7 If you are interested in seeing how the model performs when run on individual states, Appendix 5 shows this 
for the 2000 primary.  The state results are largely consistent with the overall results in Table 2.  
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given that Reagan took socially conservative positions in 1976 on issues such as abortion, 
though he did not emphasize them greatly in his campaign (Black and Black 2002). 
Three of the six elections readily exhibit the kind of division within the Republican 
electorate which I expected  1980, 1996, and 2000.  For these contests the more 
conservative primary candidate performs significantly worse in counties with more college 
educated populations, but better in counties with more Evangelicals.  The negligible effects 
of income I have already explained, but just on the surface of things without performing any 
kind of statistical analysis the moderate candidates do better in wealthier counties.8  The 
1992 case also shows this pattern of division, though none of the coefficients are significant.  
Even the Robertson candidacy exhibits the theorized education and income division in the 
county vote, but the exception here, as stated above, is that the televangelist performs better 
as a result of there being more religious followers in a county regardless of their affiliation.  
Thus, we have five primaries which more or less follow the expected pattern of division in 
the aggregate.  Reagans 1976 case certainly shows the strongest anti-conservative effect on 
college education, but the performance of the Evangelical coefficient that year keeps this 
election from being a good match to my theory. 
It is possible that a regional effect for the South is influencing the results?  That 
region is traditionally associated with higher levels of poverty, lower levels of education, the 
highest percentages of Evangelicals, and a fundamental salience of race in its politics (Black 
and Black 1987).  Some candidates such as Reagan have tried to market themselves 
                                                
8 I have divided the counties in every primary year into per capita income quartiles. To determine quartiles I 
took the range of per capita incomes for all counties and divided the range into four equal income groups.  I 
then calculate the average county vote for both relevant primary candidates in each quartile.  The positive 
relationship between per capita income and support for the more moderate candidate is visible in most of the bar 
graphs, though this effect washes out in regression and even reverses in 1980. The distance between candidate 
performance in higher and lower quartiles is greatest in the three years with two competitive candidates, 
meaning the division between the richest and poorest quartile is most prominent in those years.  See Appendix 4 
for these graphs. 
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especially to Southern conservatives on the basis of racial and cultural issues, plus candidates 
from the South have a natural advantage in primaries in the region given the salience of 
Southern identity among voters there (Black and Black 2002).  Thus, given the importance of 
the region itself and its relation to some of the key predictors in the model, it is important to 
account for regional effects in the model.  Running a Southern dummy with the state fixed 
effects dummies, however, introduces multicollinearity as the variable yields variance 
inflation scores between 30 and 40.  
To remedy this situation, I run a version of the model dropping the state dummies and 
including a Southern dummy as a predictor.  Appendix 6 shows the results of this analysis.  
In these applications, the South dummy is significant on three occasions, indicating 
occasional regional effects in primary voting; however, we are most concerned with how the 
presence of this variable in the model affects the other predictors of interest.  Though there 
are some changes on certain coefficients, including the Southern variable leaves the basic 
pattern of effects for education, income, and county Evangelicalism intact.  The education 
coefficients exhibit modest changes in size, though there are no sign changes and only one 
significance change (Buchanan 1992 become significantly negative  consistent with the 
theory).  Income becomes more consistently significant to the disadvantage of conservative 
primary candidates, though Reagan 1976 drops out of significance and there are two sign 
changes in directions consistent with the division theory.  Evangelicalism remains basically 
intact with the Southern dummy.  Overall, then, we can be fairly sure that the results of the 
county vote model we have seen are not driven by misspecification in the form of an absent 
Southern dummy.  Adding that variable enhances the predictive power of the model, but it 
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just should not be run at the same time as the fixed effects dummies given the 
multicollinearity problem. 
How, then, do these results help us understand Franks WMK thesis and the general 
issue of intra-party factionalism within Republican ranks?  Is there support for his argument 
when we reapply it to the Republican Party instead of the electorate as a whole?  Overall the 
key variables in the model demonstrate considerable support for the thesis of division within 
the Republican party-in-the-electorate and how that division manifests itself along 
demographic lines, at least in the aggregate.  Though he writes a book about the Kansas 
Republican Party, Frank frames his argument in WMK in terms of the general electorate.  His 
argument is compelling, but Franks dubious generalization finds limited support when 
Bartels and Stonecash look at the population as a whole.  It makes more sense to restrict our 
analysis to the Republican Party itself given that that is what Frank wrote about in his book.  
Indeed, doing so generates support for the basic WMK thesis about how the electorate is 
divided and where social conservative candidates and moderates can find support.  Frank is 
on the right track with his argument, but his theory is much better suited for helping us 
understand internal Republican Party dynamics than it is for shedding light on political 
behavior within the broader electorate.9 
                                                
9 The analysis here clearly deals with division within the national Republican electorate in the context of party 
primaries, not with divisions within specific state Republican parties.  As WMK is a case study of the Kansas 
Republicans, it makes sense to apply the same model I use on national primaries to Republican primaries for 
statewide office in Kansas.  I collected election results for all contested statewide Republican primaries in 
Kansas from 1994 to 2006 for offices as high as senator and governor to ones as low as insurance commissioner 
and state treasurer.  I then selected those contests where there was clearly a candidate from the moderate faction 
opposing a Republican from the conservative faction and applied the model to those election results.  
Surprisingly, in over a dozen races I analyze, very few of the predictors  neither the main ones of interest nor 
the other controls  emerge as significant.  Why should there be such a disparity between the promising results 
at the national level and the dismal results in Kansas?  After all, if there is any one state that should reflect mass 
Republican division of the kind Frank describes, it should be Kansas  the very state about which he writes. 
Perhaps one statistical explanation for these results lies in the numerical ranges of the predictors.  For the 
national data there is a wide range of values for all the independent variables, but Kansas is much more 
homogeneous than the national picture, particularly on the most important variables  income, education, and 
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Though I am certainly aware of the ecological inference problem and acknowledge 
that my results here can only tell us what dynamics are occurring at the aggregate level, I 
have obviously tried to theorize about what individual level phenomena these aggregate 
results might be reflecting.  If the data were available to compare individual voting trends 
over time, I would certainly prefer that approach; however, those data do not exist in any 
reliable and academically suitable form, so I have tried to hypothesize as best I can based on 
micro theory why candidates might be performing better in areas with certain demographic 
traits.10   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
religion.  Indeed, its lack of diversity is striking.  In other words, these variables might be too close to being 
constants at the county level for an effect to be observed.  You cannot predict a variable with a constant 
obviously.  Frank does couch his thesis more in terms of neighborhoods and precincts, especially the divide 
between socially conservative working class areas of Johnson County in the Kansas City suburbs and its 
wealthier, more moderate upper class neighborhoods.  An analysis at that level might reveal the kind of 
differing bases for the two factions he theorizes, but that pattern does not emerge at the state level.   
 
10 I have tried to employ Gary Kings Ecological Inference (EI) program to infer voting patterns 
among Republican Catholics, Evangelicals, and Mainline Protestants for all the primaries from 1976 to 2000; 
however, it produces estimates that are clearly inaccurate.  When I use the EI on the 2000 data, for example, it 
estimates that Bush won only 7% of Republican Catholics with a lower bound of the possible true value at 
almost zero and the upper bound at almost one.  Given that the bounds of EI estimates run from 0 to 1, this is 
not an estimate in which I put much confidence.  Exit poll data from 2000 reveal that a 7% share is far off the 
mark anyhow.  EI also estimates that Bush won 87% of the Evangelical vote.  Though I do not doubt he won a 
majority of Republican Evangelicals, I have a hard time believing it was such an overwhelming landslide. EI 
requires three columns of data to produce estimates.  Let us imagine we want an estimate of Bushs Mainline 
Republican vote in 2000.  Two columns are the total primary vote in a county and the percentage of it which 
Bush won; obviously, we can know both of these.  The third column requires me to input the percentage of 
Republicans in a county that are Mainline.  No such data exist, so I used the National Election Study from each 
of the years to find regional estimates of the percentage of Southern Republicans, for example, who are 
Mainline Protestants.  In 2000, 28.74% of Southern Republicans identified as Mainline, so I used that value as 
the county estimate for every Southern county.  Though not perfect, this is better than a national estimate at 
least for Protestants.  It is problematic approach when estimating the Catholic vote, especially in the South 
because I would be telling EI that a certain percentage of Republicans in a county are Catholic when the 
religious census data indicate that no Catholics live in that county (and there are many localities like this in the 
South).  Obviously we cannot estimate a percentage of something that does not exist.  The results which EI 
gives, however, are clearly questionable, possibly as a result of my regional estimates, so I do not even bother to 
report these results.  I cannot think of any other method which would overcome the ecological inference 
problem and provide estimates of the Republican vote by religion using the data at hand.   
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FEELING THERMOMETERS 
 
 The NES includes data about religious belonging that does discriminate between 
Mainline and Evangelical Protestants, plus other measures of religious activity and belief.  Is 
there any support for the mass factions theory in those data?  No NES samples include 
enough respondents who voted in their respective party primaries to allow any sort of 
adequate statistical analysis of primary voting.  The next best variable available for which a 
measurement is taken for most major primary contenders is the feeling thermometer.  These 
items might offer an interesting supplement to the county vote models. 
Obviously I cannot use the same exact variables for individual data as I do for 
counties, so I must find the closest question in the NES to all of the county demographics.  
For example, household income is the best individual level proxy for per capita income while 
the black feeling thermometer is the most consistently used replacement for county minority 
population. As the NES includes measures of religiosity other than just belonging, I take 
advantage of these data.  Church attendance is available as a measure of religious activity.  
Belief in the Bible as the literal word of God, the core characteristic of Christian 
fundamentalism, is included as a measure of religious belief.11  See appendix 2 for a list of 
the NES variables I use to approximate the county data and their codings.   
 
[Table 3 Here] 
                                                
11 I was concerned about using the church attendance and fundamentalism dummies in the feeling thermometer 
model when I had no counterpart for them in the county level election results model.  I ran two separate OLS 
models for the feeling thermometers, one including the two measures of religious activity and belief and one 
excluding them.  Using church attendance and fundamentalism does not significantly change the basic pattern 
of significant coefficients observed, nor does it radically alter coefficient sizes.  Thus, I am confident that they 
only increase the fit of the model and do not lead me to conclusions which are of any real difference from those 
I would have had in their absence. 
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Table 3 shows the average thermometer scores for all Republican candidates with the 
entire NES sample divided into the three major partisan groups.  The dependent variable in 
the regression models in Table 4 is the difference between the thermometer scores of the 
conservative and moderate primary candidates (i.e. Reagan  Ford in 1976).  Negative 
coefficients indicate an advantage for the moderate candidate whereas positive results reflect 
a conservative candidate advantage.  It might also make sense to construct separate models 
for the individual candidate feeling thermometers.  While choosing to vote for one candidate 
necessarily precludes voting for the other (thus, affecting his vote share), this is not the case 
with affect.  The thermometer score a respondent gives to one candidate may be completely 
independent of the score she assigns to another.  Many NES respondents do indeed rank all 
candidates high on the thermometer, perhaps due to some positivity bias.  Even with 
respondents in the same party, there are many Republicans who feel favorably toward both 
Bush and McCain, for example, even though they chose to support one or the other in the 
primary.   
 
[Table 4 Here] 
 
Nevertheless, the difference between the scores would be more revealing of any 
affective divisions among Republican partisans.  The WMK thesis is fundamentally about the 
schism within Republican ranks; thus, it makes sense to restrict the thermometer analysis to 
self-identified partisans.  Table 4 shows the OLS results for the thermometer differences.12  If 
                                                
12 Every OLS equation here passes tests for multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and influential data points.  No 
interactions were significant in the models, so they are excluded from the tables. 
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we are to judge partisan division on the basis of significant regression coefficients, then these 
results are hardly the picture of deep factionalism one might expect based upon the aggregate 
results.  Especially if we think of a candidate like McCain whom conventional wisdom says 
particularly raised the ire of the religious right by condemning it for all the wickedness and 
political misfortune it supposedly brought upon the party, it is a bit disappointing not to see 
more significant differences.   
Only a few predictors are significant to any consistent degree.  Two religion 
measures, weekly church attendance and fundamentalist Bible beliefs, show large biases 
toward conservative candidates (except Buchanan 1996 on attendance) across a number of 
elections.  These are actually some of the most substantial effects in the table.  Not 
surprisingly, Robertson is the candidate who gains the most from these items, a reflection of 
the symbolic nature of his candidacy among the most religious and doctrinally conservative 
Republicans.  Attending church regularly or maintaining an often maligned fundamentalist 
belief requires a certain degree of commitment which simple church affiliation does not 
demand.  The extremity of certain candidates almost certainly works as a signal to the most 
committed of the religious right, producing more favorable feelings toward them and greater 
electoral support from these movement conservatives when other partisans shy away from 
them in favor of more mainstream contenders.  It is generally the candidates who are the 
most extreme in their religious rhetoric and the least credible  Robertson and Buchanan  
who gain the most from these two items.  Catholic animosity toward Robertson clearly 
comes across on the Catholic dummy in 1988, the absolute largest effect in the entire table.  
Republican strength is the third rather consistently significant predictor, though it most often 
affects these two least credible Republicans and it does so to their detriment. 
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If we ignore significance for a moment, the results do show some remnants of 
primary season division that are extremely muted.  Though the results are insignificant, there 
is a tendency for college educated, wealthier, and Catholic Republican respondents to score 
the more moderate candidate higher on the thermometer.  Church attendance and Biblical 
beliefs generally outdo any Evangelicalism effects both in size and significance, generally 
boosting scores for the conservatives as outlined earlier.  Though Evangelicals are generally 
associated with more frequent church attendance and a greater probability of fundamentalist 
beliefs when compared to Mainline Protestants and Catholics, it is well documented that 
measures of religious belief and behavior are far more powerful than simple measures of 
belonging such as denomination (Layman 2001).  Thus, it is not surprising to see attendance 
and the Bible variable as the strong religious predictors of division among Republicans in the 
NES with denominational variables less important.   
 The question remains, however, about why these divisions are so subdued in the NES.  
The first possibility has to do with the nature of the NES itself and the time frame in which it 
is in the field.  The part of the survey with the thermometers is taken in late fall, more than 
half a year after the primaries end.  In 1980, that is months after Bush stopped criticizing 
Reagan and agreed to be his running mate.  For 2000, that is months after McCain dropped 
out, endorsed Bush, and campaigned extensively for the Texas governor.  The gap between 
the primaries and the NES interview leaves plenty of time for factional animosities to wane, 
especially as the dynamics of the general election might reinforce partisan predispositions 
and make Republicans feel more favorable towards even the politicians from other party 
factions they voted against in the primary.  Evangelical Republicans, for example, may have 
felt a healthy amount of animosity toward McCain in early 2000, but by the time the NES 
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rolls around to their doorsteps around Election Day McCain looks good in comparison to Al 
Gore.  They still may not feel as warmly toward McCain as they do toward Bush, but months 
of partisan campaign messages might prime his partisanship over his anti-Christian right 
rhetoric in their considerations of how to respond to the thermometer item.   
 Secondly, affect as measured by the thermometer might not be the same as voting 
preferences within a partisan primary.  Socially conservative voters may prefer Reagan to 
Bush because of policy preferences or perceived affiliation with the religious right, but that 
does not necessarily translate into negative feelings for Bush.  The same argument applies to 
McCain despite conventional wisdom.  Certainly at the elite level there are a number of 
Republican politicians and party leaders who take this moderate-conservative division so 
seriously that it becomes for them a matter of bitter personality politics or an emotionally-
laden civil war to defend what they perceive are correct Republican values.  These 
ideologues, however, may succeed in conveying the cognitive, perhaps more rational aspects 
of Republican division without also imparting the affective component of that conflict.   
For example, churchgoing Republicans should act consistently with their values and 
policy interests by voting against McCain because he is more of a social libertarian who 
opposes a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage than a true social conservative.  Though 
they may disagree with McCain on these relevant social issues, this may not stop rank and 
file Republicans from feeling rather positively about him given his record of military service, 
likable personality, his dedication to Reagan-style fiscal conservatism, or the simple fact that 
he, like them, is also a Republican.  There are no exit poll or publicly available survey data 
from the actual primary time frame that would allow a test of whether Republican voters are 
making this kind of affective versus cognitive distinction in their evaluation of potential 
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presidential nominees.  This theory, however, might explain the subdued division among 
Republican respondents in the NES if the time component which I offered as my first 
explanation is insufficient. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I began this work with an attempt to resuscitate many of the assertions Thomas Frank 
makes in WMK by taking his theory and refocusing it more specifically on the Republican 
Party.  Factionalism at the elite level of the party clearly exists, but does the Republican 
party-in-the-electorate reflect that division?  Is there one mass camp of Republicans who are 
characteristically higher income, better educated, and less Evangelical who support more 
moderate party candidates against more conservative candidates who find their support from 
the ranks of partisans who are poorer, less likely to be college educated, and more 
Evangelical? 
 The aggregate data here support the idea that such a division in the electorate does 
indeed emerge in voting patterns.  Though not all of the important predictors are significant 
and in the expected direction in the same election, there is evidence of the theorized factional 
lines that manifests itself across the set of six elections analyzed here.  Indeed, the voting 
divides within the Republican ranks do not confine themselves simply to elections where 
credible candidates from the two camps engage in a genuinely competitive primary contest as 
we see intriguing results for the less competitive nomination battles.  While the aggregate 
data are reasonably supportive of the theory presented here, we must bear in mind that these 
results cannot necessarily be generalized to individual level behavior.  Certainly we may 
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theorize about what underlying micro phenomena the aggregate data reflect, but the data 
simply do not exist for us to test such ideas.  Though we cannot say definitively whether 
division in the act of voting carries over to affective evaluations among Republicans, there is 
at least partial support for the basic WMK thesis in the thermometer evaluations available in 
the NES.  The fault lines within the party are visible in survey respondents, but they are 
muted to the point that they are generally not even significant.   
 On a broader level, why does any of this matter?  Why care about how Republicans 
are dividing themselves in the process of choosing their nominees?  From a purely academic 
perspective it seems as though primaries are the obscure cousin of general elections in the 
campaigns and elections literature.  Scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the 
November contests, but the work on primaries is much less developed.  Anything which 
advances our understanding of these contests is worthwhile, especially as primaries have 
come to play an important role in weeding candidates out of the presidential races early and 
as primaries at the congressional level have become the real forum for popular choice and 
representation in light of the increased partisan gerrymandering of late which has made 
general elections virtually irrelevant in many places.  Other political scientists have engaged 
the WMK thesis with the intent of discrediting it completely, but its reapplication to the 
context of Republican primaries certainly helps us understand what mechanisms are at work 
in those contests. 
 These divisions within Republican ranks help us understand the growing place of 
religion in American politics.  Religion has undergone a dramatic transformation from 
something that candidates like Franklin Roosevelt and Dwight Eisenhower shunned talking 
about openly to something candidates now must embrace and profess publicly even to be 
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considered as viable.  Religion has been the driving force behind growing Republican 
strength in recent decades, bringing the religious right movement to the heart of political 
power in American democracy.  Christian conservatives have sunk their lot into the 
Republican Party just as African-Americans have done with the Democrats, so we need to 
understand better the place they have found for themselves as scholars. 
 As the religious right has grown stronger and division within elite Republican ranks 
has become more caustic, we have begun to see real consequences of this partisan infighting 
that carry over into the general election and governance.  Capitalizing on splits among 
Republican voters and the inability of that party to unify itself after contentious nomination 
contests, Democrats have found themselves better able to compete in states like Kansas that 
ten years ago were killing fields for anyone with a D next to their name on the ballot.  
Democrats are surging in states like Virginia and North Carolina that were seemingly 
slipping from their grasp in recent years.   
These primaries, when they do not occur in places that Democrats can legitimately 
contest, help fuel the growing elite polarization of American politics.  There are real policy 
consequences in choosing a McCain versus a Bush.  When Kansas Republicans held their 
Senate primaries in 1996, they faced a clear choice of either moderating the Senate by 
renominating appointed incumbent Sheila Frahm or turning the chamber to the right by 
nominating her challenger Sam Brownback.  They obviously chose the latter, a choice 
replicated by Republicans in many states that has had dramatic consequences for both the 
tone and policy output of Washington politics. 
While this analysis is a good first step at empirically tackling this problem, there is 
clearly further work that needs attention.  Ideally the model presented here should be run on 
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individual level data taken at the time of the Republican primary.  Exit polls are not the best 
data for this next step due to their treatment of religious questions, but that is the next logical 
direction for this work.  As other data sources become available and certain statistical 
techniques are better applied, it is my hope that more evidence can shed light on the elite-
mass dynamic taking place within the Republican Party.  This question is a critical one for 
understanding the growing importance of religion in our political system and the niche the 
religious right has found within the Republican ranks, so it is certainly one that merits further 
exploration beyond this initial analysis.  
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Table 1. Primary States Included in Analysis by Year 
 
Year State Date Primary Type Candidate % 
    Ford Reagan 
New Hampshire 2/24 Modified Open 50 49 
Massachusetts 3/2 Modified Open 62 33 
Vermont 3/2 Open 85 15 
Florida 3/9 Closed 53 47 
Illinois 2/16 Open 59 40 
North Carolina 3/23 Open 46 52 
Wisconsin 4/16 Open 55 44 
Pennsylvania 4/27 Closed 94 5 (write in) 
Georgia 5/4 Open 32 68 
Indiana 5/4 Open 49 51 
Nebraska 5/11 Closed 45 55 
West Virginia 5/11 Modified Open 57 43 
Maryland 5/18 Closed 58 42 
Michigan 5/18 Modified Open 65 34 
Arkansas 5/25 Closed 35 59 
Idaho 5/25 Open 25 74 
Kentucky 5/25 Closed 51 47 
Nevada 5/25 Closed 29 66 
Oregon 5/25 Modified Open 55 45 
Tennessee 5/25 Open 50 49 
Montana 6/1 Open 35 63 
Rhode Island 6/1 Modified Open 51 24 
South Dakota 6/1 Closed 44 51 
California 6/8 Closed 35 66 
1976 
Ohio 6/8 Modified Open 55 45 
    Bush Reagan 
New Hampshire 2/26 Modified Open 23 50 
Massachusetts 3/4 Modified Open 29 28 
Vermont 3/4 Open 22 30 
South Carolina 3/8 Open 15 55 
Alabama 3/11 Open 26 73 
Florida 3/11 Closed 30 57 
Georgia 3/11 Open 13 73 
Illinois 3/18 Open 11 48 
Connecticut 3/25 Closed 38 34 
Kansas 4/1 Modified Open 13 63 
Wisconsin 4/11 Open 30 40 
Louisiana 4/15 Closed 19 75 
Pennsylvania 4/22 Closed 51 43 
Texas 5/3 Open 51 47 
1980 
Indiana 5/6 Open 16 74 
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North Carolina 5/6 Closed 22 68 
Tennessee 5/6 Open 18 74 
Maryland 5/13 Closed 41 48 
Nebraska 5/13 Closed 15 76 
Michigan 5/20 Modified Open 58 32 
 
Oregon 5/20 Modified Open 35 54 
    Bush Robertson 
New Hampshire 2/16 Modified Open 38 9 
South Dakota 2/23 Closed 55 20 
South Carolina 3/5 Open 48 20 
Alabama 3/5 Open 65 14 
Arkansas 3/8 Closed 47 19 
Florida 3/8 Closed 62 11 
Georgia 3/8 Open 54 16 
Kentucky 3/8 Closed 66 4 
Louisiana 3/8 Closed 58 18 
Maryland 3/8 Closed 53 6 
Mississippi 3/8 Open 66 14 
Missouri 3/8 Modified Open 42 11 
Oklahoma 3/8 Closed 38 21 
Tennessee 3/8 Open 60 13 
Texas 3/8 Open 64 15 
Virginia 3/8 Open 53 14 
1988 
Illinois 3/15 Open 55 26 
    Bush Buchanan 
New Hampshire 2/18 Modified Open 53 38 
Colorado 3/3 Modified Open 68 30 
Georgia 3/3 Open 64 36 
Maryland 3/3 Closed 70 30 
South Carolina 3/7 Open 67 26 
Florida 3/10 Closed 68 32 
Louisiana 3/10 Closed 62 27 
Massachusetts 3/10 Modified Open 66 28 
Mississippi 3/10 Open 72 17 
Oklahoma 3/10 Closed 70 24 
Rhode Island 3/10 Modified Open 63 32 
Tennessee 3/10 Open 73 22 
Texas 3/10 Open 70 24 
Illinois 3/17 Open 76 23 
Michigan 3/17 Modified Open 67 25 
1992 
Connecticut 3/24 Closed 67 22 
    Dole Buchanan 
New Hampshire 2/20 Modified Open 26 27 
Delaware 2/24 Closed 27 19 
1996 
Arizona 2/27 Open 30 28 
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South Dakota 2/27 Closed 45 29 
North Dakota 2/27 Open 42 18 
South Carolina 3/2 Open 45 29 
Colorado 3/5 Modified Open 44 22 
Georgia 3/5 Open 41 29 
Connecticut 3/5 Closed 55 21 
Maine 3/5 Modified Open 46 25 
Maryland 3/5 Closed 53 21 
Massachusetts 3/5 Modified Open 48 25 
Vermont 3/5 Open 40 17 
Florida 3/12 Closed 57 18 
Louisiana 3/12 Closed 48 33 
Mississippi 3/12 Open 60 26 
Oklahoma 3/12 Closed 60 22 
Oregon 3/12 Modified Open 51 4 
Tennessee 3/12 Open 51 26 
Texas 3/12 Open 56 21 
Illinois 3/19 Open 65 23 
Michigan 3/19 Modified Open 51 34 
Ohio 3/19 Modified Open 67 22 
Wisconsin 3/19 Open 52 34 
California 3/26 Closed 66 18 
Nevada 3/26 Closed 52 15 
 
Washington 3/26 Open 63 21 
    McCain Bush 
New Hampshire 2/1 Modified Open 49 30 
Delaware 2/5 Closed 25 31 
South Carolina 2/19 Open 42 53 
Arizona 2/22 Open 60 36 
Michigan 2/22 Modified Open 51 43 
Virginia 2/29 Closed 44 53 
Washington 2/29 Blanket Open 63 34 
California 3/7 Blanket Open 35 60 
Connecticut 3/7 Closed 49 47 
Georgia 3/7 Open 27 68 
Maine 3/7 Modified Open 43 53 
Maryland 3/7 Closed 36 56 
Massachusetts 3/7 Modified Open 65 32 
Missouri 3/7 Modified Open 35 58 
Ohio 3/7 Modified Open 37 58 
Rhode Island 3/7 Modified Open 60 36 
2000 
Vermont 3/7 Open 61 35 
Note: Vote shares do not add up to 100% because they are the candidate share of the vote for the entire field of 
candidates, not the share of the two candidate vote.  For Bush and McCain in 2000, for example, the 49% and 
30% respectively in New Hampshire reflect the fact that other candidates such as Lamar Alexander and Steven 
Forbes took sizable shares of the vote. 
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Table 2. Robust Regression of County Republican Primary Vote 
for Conservative Candidates, 1976-2000 
 
Variable Reagan 
1976 
Reagan 
1980 
Robertson
1988 
Buchanan 
1992 
Buchanan 
1996 
Bush 
2000 
College 
Educated 
-.829*** 
(.116) 
-.961*** 
(.117) 
-.054** 
(.018) 
-.086 
(.064) 
-.681*** 
(.095) 
-.438*** 
(.047) 
Per Capita 
Income 
.446* 
(.203) 
-1.301*** 
(.210) 
.283 
(.172) 
.093 
(.140) 
.009 
(.155) 
.068 
(.096) 
% Mainline -.067 
(.039) 
.048* 
(.023) 
.022 
(.036) 
-.015 
(.029) 
-.134*** 
(.025) 
.048 
(.036) 
% Evangelical -.110*** 
(.024) 
.078*** 
(.022) 
.139*** 
(.023) 
-.005 
(.020) 
.071** 
(.023) 
.099*** 
(.026) 
% Catholic -.030 
(.028) 
-.012 
(.020) 
.014 
(.028) 
.036 
(.022) 
.007 
(.021) 
-.103*** 
(.024) 
% Minority .174*** 
(.031) 
.005 
(.017) 
-.003 
(.013) 
-.030 
(.019) 
-.054* 
(.024) 
.145*** 
(.019) 
Republican 
Vote 
-.005 
(.038) 
.143*** 
(.028) 
-.162*** 
(030) 
.013 
(.027) 
-.024 
(.016) 
.409*** 
(.031) 
Constant 17.610 75.553 26.789 30.554 47.030 42.492 
R2 .722 .802 .475 .504 .580 .784 
N 1607 1544 1387 1130 1624 832 
Note: Table entries are OLS estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (two-tailed) 
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Table 3. Average NES Feeling Thermometer Scores for Republican Presidential 
Primary Candidates, 1976-2000 
 
Year Candidate Republicans Independents Democrats 
Ford 75 61 51 1976 
Reagan 68 56 50 
Bush 62 57 51 1980 
Reagan 73 57 46 
Bush 79 62 45 1988 
Robertson 36 32 33 
Bush 73 50 40 1992 
Buchanan 55 53 49 
Dole 69 52 43 1996 
Buchanan 54 50 48 
McCain 64 60 57 2000 
Bush 75 56 43 
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Table 4. NES Feeling Thermometer Differences for Republican Presidential Primary 
Candidates, 1976-2000 
 
Variable 1976 1980 1988 1992 1996 2000 
College 
Education 
-3.757 
(3.007) 
-5.920+ 
(3.149) 
-1.459 
(3.373) 
.718 
(2.604) 
-1.278 
(2.869) 
-3.667 
(2.674) 
Household 
Income 
.356+ 
(.212) 
-.094 
(.235) 
-.126 
(.273) 
-1.749* 
(.857) 
-1.269 
(.948) 
-.271 
(.328) 
Mainline 
Protestant 
-2.711 
(4.338) 
-2.559 
(4.059) 
-1.061 
(5.583) 
-4.076 
(3.479) 
-10.142* 
(4.176) 
8.358* 
(3.463) 
Evangelical 
Protestant 
-6.632 
(4.474) 
-.926 
(4.309) 
-1.412 
(5.908) 
-4.083 
(3.725) 
-4.164 
(4.562) 
5.496 
(3.571) 
Catholic -3.749 
(4.975) 
-3.653 
(4.509) 
-16.261** 
(6.071) 
-6.770+ 
(3.924) 
-.465 
(4.521) 
2.785 
(3.655) 
Weekly 
Church 
Attendance 
1.294 
(2.698) 
6.854* 
(3.136) 
8.890*** 
(3.332) 
6.126* 
(2.584) 
-5.957* 
(3.012) 
-1.670 
(2.766) 
Bible N/A 1.776 
(2.866) 
12.768*** 
(3.416) 
.008*** 
(2.625) 
10.621** 
(3.201) 
4.630 
(2.881) 
Strong 
Republican 
-1.240 
(2.289) 
1.058 
(2.719) 
-10.237** 
(2.942) 
-7.198** 
(2.248) 
-9.060** 
(2.614) 
5.628* 
(2.419) 
Black 
Thermometer 
-.131+ 
(.076) 
-.074 
(.075) 
.026 
(.079) 
.021 
(.055) 
.020 
(.064) 
-.028 
(.063) 
Southerner -.767 
(3.158) 
3.876 
(3.128) 
-7.204* 
(3.554) 
1.128 
(2.617) 
-1.267 
(2.782) 
3.410 
(2.534) 
Constant .569 15.297 -40.931 -9.268 -2.958 7.494 
Adjusted R2 .003 .015 .132 .019 .069 .045 
N 466 287 393 624 471 344 
Note: The 1976 difference fails the F-test, but the rest pass with significant F-statistics.  
Table entries are OLS estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
+p <.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (two-tailed) 
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Appendix 1: County Election Results Model 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
●Percent of vote for candidate  scaled 0 to 100 (Cooke 2000 for 1976-1996, various state 
election board websites for 2000 primary results) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
●Percent College Educated  scaled 0 to 100; percentage of population in a county holding 
at least a four year college degree (US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000); 
 
●Per Capita Income  scaled to the exact dollar with coefficients in tables reported as unit 
change per $1000 increase in per capita income (US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000); 
 
●Percent Mainline Protestants  scaled 0 to 100, white denominations only; 
The Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States 2000 does not report membership 
numbers for traditionally African-American churches, so I exclude those churches from my county 
counts for 1970 through 1990.  This should not present a problem given that the hostility blacks feel 
toward the religious right makes them less susceptible to movement rhetoric (Calhoun-Brown 1997).  
Blacks have not made up more than a trivial percentage of the vote in Republican presidential 
primaries since 1976 anyhow (Mayer 2002), so excluding their churches would not be putting potential 
primary voters into the unknown affiliation column.     
 
●Percent Catholics  scaled 0 to 100; 
 
●Percent Evangelical Protestants  scaled 0 to 100, white denominations only; 
 
●Percent Minority  scaled 0 to 100, calculated as African-American plus Hispanic 
population (US Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000); 
This is a necessary control.  Proximity to black (Glaser 1994) and Hispanic (Stein, Post, and Rinden 
2000) populations produces voting patterns among whites based upon negative affect for minority 
groups.  Racial appeals have been a critical component in the Republican strategy for growth in the 
South, a region where many white Evangelicals reside (Black and Black 1987, 2002), so controlling 
for racial proximity is a necessity. 
 
●Previous Republican Presidential Vote  scaled 0 to 100 (McGillivray 2005); If the 
previous election was competitive (1976, 1988, and 1996), then I just take the Republican 
vote from that year as the value for this variable.  If the previous election was a landslide 
(1972 and 1984) or featured a third party candidate who took a large percentage of the vote 
(1992 and 1968), then I average the previous two elections for this value; 
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Appendix 2: Feeling Thermometer Model 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
●Feeling Thermometer Score  scaled 0 to 100  
 
Independent Variables 
 
●Household Income  continuous variable scaled in $1000 increments 
 
●College Degree  dummy variable; 0 = no degree, 1 = bachelors degree or more 
 
●Mainline Protestant  dummy variable; 0 = not Mainline, 1 = Mainline 
Note:  I group respondents into the Mainline or Evangelical category based upon the affiliation of their 
specific Christian denomination.  For example, self-reported Baptists I code as Evangelicals as their 
church is considered an Evangelical one, but Methodists are categorized as Mainline.  Some NES years 
ask respondents specifically whether they are Mainline or Evangelical; however, upon examining the 
data, it is clear that a sizable minority of respondents cannot correctly place their church within the 
correct school of Protestantism for some unknown reason (perhaps unfamiliarity with the terms or 
simple confusion over where their church belongs).  I choose to match respondents with the correct 
school myself as I believe this is a more error free and objective measure of the general religious 
doctrines to which they are exposed in church.  An Episcopalian may not know his church is Mainline; 
nevertheless, since his report of his denomination is probably extremely accurate, we know the types 
of messages he encounters in his religious experiences.     
 
Note: The baseline group for this regression consists of all NES respondents who are not identified as 
Mainline, Evangelical, or Catholic as I include one dummy variable for each of these groups.  The vast 
majority of respondents in the baseline group are seculars who profess no religious affiliation, with 
Jewish respondents being the next largest bloc (who do not differ greatly in their voting or party 
identification from seculars), and minor religions making up the remainder. 
 
●Evangelical Protestant  dummy variable; 0 = not Evangelical, 1 = Evangelical 
 
●Catholic  dummy variable; 0 = not Catholic, 1 = Catholic 
 
●Weekly Church Attendance  dummy variable; 0 = does not attend church weekly, 1 = 
attends church weekly 
 
●Fundamentalist  dummy variable; 0 = does not believe that the Bible is the literal word of 
God and should be followed literally; 1 = believes the Bible is the literal word of God and 
should be followed literally 
 
●Black Feeling Thermometer  continuous variable scaled 0 to 100 
Note:  The question wording on the NES items relating to aid to blacks changes from 1980 to 2000 and 
the civil rights issues asked in 1980 are not included in the 2000 NES, so the only relevant and usable 
question that remains constant between the two surveys is the feeling thermometer. 
 
●Southerner  dummy variable; 0 = non-Southerner, 1 = Southerner 
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Appendix 3: Fixed Effects Coefficients for State Dummy Variables 
 
State 1976 1980 1988 1992 1996 2000 
Alabama  11.851*** 
(1.964) 
-7.157*** 
(1.457) 
   
Arizona     14.948*** 
(2.621) 
-17.588*** 
(1.680) 
Arkansas 50.269*** 
(2.058) 
 12.980*** 
(2.182) 
   
California 48.134*** 
(1.907) 
   -15.094*** 
(1.497) 
9.982*** 
(1.414) 
Colorado    -.509 
(1.559) 
-2.923+ 
(1.525) 
 
Florida 35.37*** 
(2.2027) 
6.960*** 
(1.906) 
.058 
(1.630) 
2.582 
(1.667) 
-7.397*** 
(1.693) 
 
Georgia 54.718*** 
(1.953) 
24.846*** 
(1.946) 
-1.142 
(1.235) 
9.275*** 
(1.817) 
8.509*** 
(1.763) 
9.290*** 
(1.663) 
Idaho 58.025*** 
(2.054) 
     
Illinois 28.572*** 
(1.695) 
22.031*** 
(1.770) 
16.078*** 
(1.931) 
-8.692*** 
(1.437) 
-10.953*** 
(1.484) 
 
Indiana 35.147*** 
(1.665) 
18.473*** 
(1.804) 
    
Kansas  24.280*** 
(1.708) 
    
Kentucky 31.685*** 
(1.879) 
 -9.482*** 
(1.142) 
   
Louisiana  20.919*** 
(1.887) 
6.771*** 
(1.723) 
-.635 
(1.782) 
7.323*** 
(1.766) 
 
Maryland & 
Delaware 
26.508*** 
(1.995) 
.306 
(2.372) 
-9.871*** 
(1.439) 
-1.607 
(1.530) 
-1.819 
(1.860) 
9.570*** 
(1.659) 
Michigan 20.194*** 
(1.716) 
-24.757*** 
(1.740) 
 -3.341* 
(1.486) 
.636 
(1.413) 
-9.404*** 
(1.309) 
Mississippi   -7.641*** 
(1.291) 
-12.940*** 
(2.007) 
-8.962*** 
(2.130) 
 
Missouri   13.727*** 
(2.496) 
  6.340*** 
(1.475) 
Montana 52.543*** 
(1.906) 
     
Nebraska 46.067*** 
(1.719) 
21.099*** 
(1.762) 
    
Nevada 59.501*** 
(2.348) 
   -14.324*** 
(1.819) 
 
North Carolina 37.471*** 
(2.054) 
13.089*** 
(1.856) 
    
North Dakota     -3.147+ 
(1.629) 
 
Ohio 29.584*** 
(3.015) 
   -12.275*** 
(1.437) 
5.407*** 
(1.456) 
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Oklahoma   13.151*** 
(1.511) 
-4.052* 
(1.698) 
-11.042*** 
(1.689) 
 
Oregon 38.063*** 
(2.193) 
8.202*** 
(2.182) 
  -6.367*** 
(1.439) 
 
Pennsylvania  -11.841*** 
(1.834) 
    
South Carolina  14.411*** 
(2.036) 
5.026** 
(1.453) 
-4.863* 
(1.955) 
.515 
(1.940) 
-7.671*** 
(1.861) 
South Dakota 42.931*** 
(1.848) 
 31.150*** 
(1.642) 
 4.123** 
(1.504) 
 
Tennessee 36.425*** 
(1.903) 
17.723*** 
(1.898) 
-8.576*** 
(1.134) 
-7.855*** 
(1.723) 
-6.509*** 
(1.635) 
 
Texas  4.543* 
(1.994) 
.346 
(1.123) 
-5.351** 
(1.666) 
-8.360*** 
(1.699) 
 
Virginia   -2.839* 
(1.151) 
  2.052 
(1.707) 
Washington     -12.550*** 
(1.635) 
8.750*** 
(1.495) 
West Virginia 26.451*** 
(1.669) 
     
Wisconsin 30.650*** 
(1.791) 
-.897 
(1.843) 
  .127 
(1.425) 
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Appendix 4: County Election Results by Per Capita Income Quartile 
 
 
1976 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Income Quartiles
Vo
te
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Ford 42.35 48.18 52.68 57.32
Reagan 56.34 50.84 46.54 41.9
$3081-$6389 $6390-$9698 $9699-$13007 $13008-$16312
 
 
 
1980 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Income Quartiles
Vo
te
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Reagan 77.49 65.74 53.9 48.17
Bush 13.63 21.98 30.36 33.26
$4471-$8521 $8522-$12572 $12573-$16623 $16624-$20669
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1988 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Income Quartiles
Vo
te
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Bush 53.72 51.82 57.2 55.01
Dole 23.73 23.59 21.85 27.21
Robertson 17.34 18.09 13.93 9.83
$4419-$8712 $8713-$13006 $13007-$17300 $17301-$21541
 
 
 
1992 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Income Quartiles
Vo
te
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Bush 68.83 68.64 66.51 71.06
Buchanan 26.03 27.33 29.66 26.05
$4152-$9802 $9803-$15453 $15454-$21104 $21105-$26755
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45 
 
 
1996 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Income Quartiles
Vo
te
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Dole 49.62 52.49 54.18 61.93
Buchanan 31.5 26.91 19.31 14.65
$3417-$9658 $9659-$15900 $15901-$22142 $22143-$24964
 
 
 
2000 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Income Quartiles
Vo
te
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Bush 60.77 54.58 50.97 43.55
McCain 34.25 39.83 44.22 53.46
Keyes 3.76 4.03 3.86 2.42
$8986-$17980 $17981-$26975 $26976-$35970 $35971-$44962
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Appendix 5: State Regression of 2000 Primary Results 
N
 
A
djusted R
2 
C
onstant 
R
epublican 
V
ote 
%
 M
inority 
%
 Catholic 
%
 Evangelical 
%
 M
ainline 
Per Capita 
Incom
e
C
ollege 
Education
V
ariable 
73 
.281 
11.000 
.846***   
(.175) 
.143         
(.106) 
.017    
(.149) 
-.570        
(.466) 
.920       
(1.145) 
.763    
(.491) 
-.280   
(.344) 
A
rizona &
 
C
alifornia 
27 
.559 
72.158 
.405+  
(.202)
.022    
(.100)
-.059   
(.152)
-.109    
(.243) 
-.114   
(.137)
-1.226* 
(.470)
.227     
(.207) 
D
elaw
are &
 
M
aryland 
159 
.214 
51.271 
.294*** 
(.073)
.144*** 
(.037)
-.575* 
(.260)
.019 
(.037)
.131 
(.123)
.724** 
(.221)
-.465*** 
(.097)
G
eorgia 
83 
.521 
10.679 
.459*** 
(.079)
.111+ 
(.065)
.031 
(.044)
.215* 
(.085)
.128 
(.105)
.812** 
(.227)
-.321** 
(.093)
M
ichigan 
115 
.197 
57.441 
.302*** 
(.082)
.066 
(.082)
.037 
(.059)
.102* 
(.049)
.046 
(.068)
-.541+ 
(.292)
-.079 
(.125)
M
issouri 
67 
.458 
34.910 
.020 
(.196) 
.056  
(.136) 
-.150* 
(.064) 
3.505*** 
(.789) 
.559+ 
(.307) 
.774+ 
(.420) 
-.734*** 
(.197) 
N
ew
 
England 
107 
.757 
40.248 
.526*** 
(.083)
.435*** 
(.103)
-.060 
(.048)
.308* 
(.118)
.136 
(.103)
.182 
(.363)
-.720*** 
(.138)
O
hio 
46 
.539 
-19.115 
.867*** 
(.134)
.602*** 
(.106)
-.773+ 
(.406)
.134 
(.096)
.039 
(.146)
1.180 
(.701)
-.592* 
(.265)
South 
C
arolina 
135 
.555 
55.111 
.346*** 
(.077)
.050 
(.038)
-.112 
(.085)
.169** 
(.053)
-.145+ 
(.075)
-.057 
(.204)
-.519*** 
(.089) 
V
irginia 
N
ote: Table entries are O
LS estim
ates w
ith estim
ated standard errors in parentheses; +p <.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (tw
o-tailed); 
N
ote:  A
s som
e states in 2000 have so few
 counties that I cannot run O
LS on them
 by them
selves, I am
 forced to com
bine several states w
ith other states that
are sim
ilar both dem
ographically and in term
s of the prim
ary election outcom
e.  C
om
binations include: 1) A
rizona and California, 2) D
elaw
are and
M
aryland (though this com
bination still falls just short of the recom
m
ended m
inim
um
 of 30 cases to run O
LS),  and 3) C
onnecticut, M
aine, M
assachusetts,
N
ew
 H
am
pshire, R
hode Island, and V
erm
ont into N
ew
 England.  A
ll individual regressions in this table pass V
IF tests for m
ulticollinearity and B
reusch -
Pagan-G
odfrey tests for heteroskedasticity.  C
alculating D
FFITS indicates that no cases are influential data points (D
FFITS > 1.0).  
39 
.711 
33.578 
.440** 
(.134)
.220*  
(.080)
-.029  
(.153)
.825** 
(.220)
.158  
(.169)
-.081   
(.293)
-.004   
(.122)
W
ashington 
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Appendix 6: Robust Regression of County Republican Primary Vote 
for Conservative Candidates with South Dummy, 1976-2000 
 
Variable Reagan 
1976 
Reagan 
1980 
Robertson
1988 
Buchanan 
1992 
Buchanan 
1996 
Bush 
2000 
College 
Educated 
-.509** 
(.186) 
-1.144*** 
(.177) 
-.030* 
(.014) 
-.275*** 
(.073) 
-.542*** 
(.096) 
-.428*** 
(.064) 
Per Capita 
Income 
.096 
(.326) 
-.914** 
(.302) 
-.515* 
(.207) 
.606*** 
(.144) 
-.564*** 
(.155) 
.296* 
(.132) 
% Mainline -.452*** 
(.053) 
.370*** 
(.040) 
.359*** 
(.042) 
-.197*** 
(.037) 
-.086*** 
(.023) 
-.032 
(.047) 
% Evangelical -.090** 
(.027) 
.160*** 
(.031) 
.110*** 
(.027) 
-.073*** 
(.019) 
-.029 
(.019) 
.205*** 
(.025) 
% Catholic -.251*** 
(.042) 
-.166*** 
(.032) 
.191*** 
(.031) 
-.030 
(.022) 
.020 
(.018) 
-.200*** 
(.034) 
% Minority .334*** 
(.034) 
.066** 
(.025) 
-.030 
(.023) 
.008 
(.020) 
-.082** 
(.031) 
.192*** 
(.023) 
Republican 
Vote 
.177** 
(.052) 
-.059 
(.038) 
-.057 
(.041) 
.092** 
(.030) 
-.008 
(.021) 
.457*** 
(.040) 
South 3.822** 
(1.124) 
1.757 
(1.304) 
-1.405 
(.944) 
1.177 
(.602) 
5.383*** 
(.901) 
-2.310** 
(.864) 
Constant 51.391 85.527 25.420 22.758 46.977 39.460 
R2 .227 .277 .095 .079 .175 .497 
N 1607 1544 1387 1130 1624 832 
Note: Table entries are OLS estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 (two-tailed) 
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